5 134 of evidence used was coded. The quantitative coding frame is provided in supplementary 135 information (File S1). A random subsample of 25% of the articles were double-coded by R2 to 136 ensure coding consistency. Data were imported into IBM SPSS version 24 to calculate inter-rater 137 agreement using Cohen's kappa coefficient (58) . 65% of codes returned a kappa score >0.4, which is 138 typically interpreted as moderate agreement or better (59) . Where less than substantial agreement was 139 identified (kappa <0.61), code definitions were discussed within the research team and the coding 140 frame and descriptor document were revised as required. 141 An overview of the slant of opinion by stakeholder was calculated based on an index 142 developed by Patterson et al (52) . The index expresses the proportion of all supportive and 143 oppositional statements associated with a stakeholder as a value on a scale from +100% (all 144 supportive) to -100% (all opposed). Cited stakeholders were grouped into six categories according 145 to their organisational affiliations: politicians and political organisations; public health organisations 146 and professional bodies; industry representatives, manufacturers and retailers; non-governmental 147 organisations (NGOs), health charities and campaigners; academics and evidence producers; and 148 think-tanks and other analysts. These categories were constructed based on the need to structure the 149 analysis by grouping stakeholders with likely shared values, and were chosen in line with the 150 research team's prior experience of researching public health policy debates. Individuals and 151 organisations allocated to each group are listed in the supplementary information (File S2). For each 152 stakeholder, the degree of support was then plotted against the total number of times that stakeholder 153 was cited to provide a graphical representation of the most vocal supportive and oppositional groups. Between 1 st April 2015 and 30 th November 2016, 491 newspaper articles were identified in 170 which stakeholders were cited as presenting arguments and evidence in the SSB tax debate (Table   171 1). Most articles were published in UK-wide newspapers (89%) and 74% appeared in 'broadsheet' 172 newspapers. 173 A wide range of stakeholders (n=287: 34% organisations / 66% individuals), were cited in 174 newspaper articles presenting views on SSB tax (n=1,761). A full list of all stakeholder organisations 175 and named individuals is supplied in the supplementary information (File S2). 65% of arguments 176 were in support of some form of SSB tax and 35% in opposition. Stakeholders infrequently cited 177 evidence in support of their arguments (12% of the time) and the type of evidence used fell into 5 178 categories: academic (citation of a specific academic study), lay opinion, expert opinion, anecdotal 179 and financial ( Table 2) . The most frequently used type of evidence was anecdotal (44%) which was 180 employed by both supporters and opponents of SSB tax. Supporters were more likely to cite a 181 specific academic study or an expert opinion than opponents.
183
Overall stance on SSB taxation 184 Plotting the aggregate stance of each stakeholder group against frequency of citations revealed 185 that public health organisations and professional medical associations (the most frequently cited 186 stakeholder group with 25% of arguments) were most often cited as proponents of SSB tax, as were The themes that arose from the qualitative analysis of stakeholder arguments could be readily 203 classified into the frame/sub-frame structure developed by researchers studying the alcohol and 7 204 tobacco industries (Table 3) . Table 3 presents summaries of typical arguments attributed to 205 stakeholders within articles, organised by stance and frame/sub-frame. Most arguments fell into the 206 evidence (40%) and regulation frames (31%), followed by the unintended consequences and other 207 benefits frame (24%), the corporate social responsibility frame (4%) and the legal frame (1%).
209
Appropriateness of regulation: 210 The arguments falling into the regulation frame focused on whether or not taxation was an 211 appropriate solution to the problem of obesity. Opponents from the food and drink industry argued 212 that the government should not intervene in the market, and that taxation would not prompt 213 behaviour change. For example, the Food and Drink Federation was quoted as stating that:
214
'Demonising one nutrient is not a healthy way to proceed. Consumer choice is the best way to go 215 because government intervention simply doesn't work.' (Independent, 28 August 2015) . Some public 
225
For example, the National Obesity Forum and Faculty of Public Health made mutually supportive 226 statements: 'Sugar is indeed the new tobacco. We know it is very harmful to health and we know we 227 can use the same effective strategies that we used in tobacco control.' And 'A little gentle pressure 228 from sugar taxes and other Government policies will help bring home the message' (Daily Mirror, 229 2 November 2016).
230
Very few supporters highlighted the argument that the SDIL could be seen as a win-win 231 solution. This position contends that the measure will either reduce sugar consumption (by 232 discouraging consumer purchasing and/or encouraging manufacturer reformulation) and raise public 233 revenue that can be reinvested in public health initiatives. The win-win concept was alluded to in 234 the 2016 Chancellor's budget statement: 'he wanted to save the nation from an obesity crisis with a 235 tax on fizzy drinks. He said he was convinced that his levy of up to 24p on a litre of fizzy pop would 236 reduce consumption and reap a tax dividend for the exchequer' (The Observer, 19 March 2016).
237
Supportive stakeholders' limited invocation of the win-win concept was potentially a missed 238 opportunity to counter opponents' arguments that sought to position reformulation as a failure of the Three key pieces of evidence were used by stakeholders to support both supportive and 267 oppositional arguments: The McKinsey report entitled Overcoming obesity: An initial economic 268 analysis (9) , the PHE report Sugar Reduction: The Evidence for Action (10) and a study published in 269 the BMJ evaluating of the impact of the SSB tax in Mexico (5) (Table 4 ).
271
Unintended consequences and other benefits -both economic and public health: 272 Arguments highlighting unintended consequences and other benefits tended to focus 273 specifically on the SDIL rather than SSB taxation more generally. Opponents argued that the SDIL 9 274 would create negative economic impacts for soft drinks manufacturers, associated industries, the 275 wider economy and consumers, particularly those in lower income groups. Opposing arguments 276 characterised the measure as: regressive; costly to implement; inflationary and likely to cause job 277 losses. For example, the British Soft Drinks Association was quoted as explaining that: 'Given the 278 economic uncertainty our country now faces, we're disappointed the Government wishes to proceed 279 with a measure that analysis suggests will cause thousands of job losses.' (Independent, 18 August 280 2016). Opponents also asserted that the levy would fail to raise the anticipated public revenue as 281 manufacturers would reformulate their products to avoid paying it, positioning this as a negative 282 outcome rather than the positive one suggested in the ''win-win'' solution.
283
Opposing arguments also emphasised the potential negative health consequences of 284 consumers replacing SSBs with other sources of sugar or artificially-sweetened beverages (ASBs), 285 suggesting that sugar is addictive and ASBs are no better for health than SSBs. The Institute for 286 Fiscal Studies was quoted as reasoning that: 'If people have a strong taste for sugar, although they 287 may respond to the increase in prices by switching away from sugary soft drinks, it's entirely possible 288 and quite likely they might switch towards other high sugar products.' (Daily Mail, 18 March 2016) .
289
In contrast, supporters of the tax argued that there would be no adverse economic impact for 290 industry or consumers, as the design of the SDIL allowed industry two years to reformulate their 291 products with less sugar and that consumers could choose from many alternatives to SSBs and thus 292 avoid the levy entirely. Additional benefits of the SDIL were highlighted in terms of: the potential 293 for reinvestment of revenue raised into health improvement programmes and subsidies for 294 ''healthy'' foods; the positive long-term impact of reduced NCDs on increased productivity and a 295 reduced burden on the NHS; and sending a strong message to industry and consumers about the 296 health impacts of excess sugar consumption. For example, the WHO was quoted as suggesting that: The role of corporate social responsibility: 315 The final frame represents a line of argument again primarily espoused by opponents of SSB 316 tax: that the soft drinks industry has a positive role to play in promoting public health and that they 317 are voluntarily reformulating their products to be healthier in response to consumer demand, without 318 the need for taxation or other regulation. For example, one soft drinks manufacturer was quoted as 319 stating that: 'Our job is to understand and have relationships with our customers, which we have 320 had for over 100 years, making sure we offer them choices. In stark contrast to other food and drink 321 categories, we have been reducing sugar content and have a strong [commitment] to do so.' and opposing arguments aligned with a typology framework developed for studying the alcohol and 338 tobacco industries (27; 28; 29) .
339
Stakeholders on each side of the debate sought to use evidence to support their arguments; 340 however, opponents were less likely to refer to specific academic studies and more likely to use 341 anecdotal evidence. Interestingly, the same reports were sometimes invoked by both proponents and 342 opponents to support their differing arguments, but using subtly different framings. The effective 343 use of evidence is a potentially important factor in influencing public support for proposed policy 344 interventions (38; 63) . However, a systematic review by Orton and colleagues found that, policy 345 makers' sceptical view of research evidence can create a key barrier to its use (64) . Our findings on 346 how evidence was used by stakeholders in the SDIL debate reinforce the importance of 347 trustworthiness and reliability in the way research is represented, and then used or dismissed.
348
The use of taxation as an intervention to influence consumer behaviour and reduce 349 consumption of unhealthy commodities is a well-established public health policy that has been used 350 effectively in relation to both tobacco and alcohol (65; 66) . However, a recent systematic review by 351 Wright and colleagues highlighted the importance for policy actors to be clear about the primary 352 objective of any health tax, be it for fiscal or health purposes, and to frame the tax accordingly (67) .
353
Failure to do so leaves a proposed tax vulnerable to hostile lobbying (67) . Our study identified 
363
A key strategy employed by other UCIs to oppose upstream regulation is the complexity 364 argument, which Petticrew et al characterise as 'Nothing can be done until everything is done' (31) .
365
Opponents of SSB tax employed this tactic by emphasising the complexity of the obesity problem, 366 and therefore the inappropriateness of discrete legislative measures. Proponents apparently 367 countered this by strategic simplification; that is by focusing on the specific health harming effects 368 of excess sugar consumption, particularly from SSBs for young people. They further emphasised 369 that the SDIL was not intended to be a 'silver bullet' to tackle obesity, but a small and important 370 first step focussing on a commodity with negligible nutritional value. Similar, apparently deliberate, 371 attempts to reframe policy debates were previously used by public health advocates in the case of 372 minimum unit pricing for alcohol (33) , and by supporters of legislation to prohibit smoking in private 373 vehicles carrying children (68) .
374
Advocates clearly need to continue to use effective arguments and embrace the persuasive 375 power of framing. However, public health advocates and academics should also be aware of the 376 potential for their over-critical analyses of nuanced aspects of policy measures to result in 'mixed 377 messages' when filtered through media gatekeepers. Nuance is a strength of academia, and many 378 academics are understandably wary of media commentators championing public health policies.
379
However, complex messages have the potential to create public confusion and actually undermine 380 the intended public health objectives. Academics readily acknowledge uncertainty, but uncertainty 381 rarely has a place in clear public communication (69) . Researchers lacking media skills can thus find 382 themselves uncomfortably positioned in complicated moral and affective landscapes, toiling to 383 represent the nuance of their research (70) . The challenge is to communicate the core truth simply, but 384 without dumbing down the message into simplistic dichotomy. The mass media lens may depict 385 rigorous academic circumspection as fragility of position, while industry representatives opposing 386 regulation are unlikely to concede any uncertainty (69) . 387 We suggest that, in a bid to downplay the contribution of SSBs to NCDs, the soft drinks 388 industry employed tactics previously used by other UCIs by 'directly lobbying' the public and 389 policy-makers, shifting blame for obesity to complexity and optimistically trying to characterise the 390 soft drinks industry as promoting healthy lifestyles (71) . Our study also supports the findings of the 391 systematic review by Mialon et al; that information and messaging is one of the most prominent 392 corporate political activities employed by food industry actors (26) .
393
Our study has relevance beyond debates about SSB tax. These data add to a growing body of 394 research demonstrating the similarities in frames promoted by different harmful commodity 395 industries across public health policy debates (27; 28; 30; 31) . Our research may therefore help to inform 396 future media strategies by advocates of upstream legislative public health measures targeting a range 397 of harmful products, including sugar, tobacco (72) and alcohol (73) . In particular, it may be helpful for 398 public health proponents to support arguments with high-quality evidence, to communicate the 399 subtleties of health policy development without undermining key objectives, and to be aware of the 400 apparent shared UCI 'playbook' (31) .
401
Our research strengths include a rigorous approach which offers a robust examination of the 402 newspaper debate around SSB tax. By coding and analysing direct quotations of stakeholders, we 403 sought to minimise the impact of editorial gatekeepers and achieve greater fidelity than the more 404 commonplace approach of analysing entire news articles. Our study is subject to the limitations 405 which are intrinsic to media content analysis. Firstly, these data do not necessarily represent Public health advocates were particularly prominent in the debate surrounding the SDIL in 423 UK newspapers. Mass media engagement can be used to influence how the public and policymakers 424 understand health problems and their solutions and thus the acceptability of specific policies (35; 75) .
425
Research into how public health policy debates unfold in the media may help to inform improved 426 media advocacy strategies (76) . Opponents' arguments resembled those used by the alcohol and (2015) Public Health England (10) 'It may also be possible, by negotiation, to improve the definition of 'high sugar foods' as the [PHE] report suggests. However, we do not agree that the international evidence supports the introduction of a sugar tax.' 
